In this paper, I discuss the discovery of the DNA structure by Francis Crick and James Watson, which has provoked a large historical literature but has yet not found entry into philosophical debates. I want to redress this imbalance. In contrast to the available historical literature, a strong emphasis will be placed upon analysing the roles played by theory, model, and evidence and the relationship between them. In particular, I am going to discuss not only Crick and Watson's well-known model and Franklin's x-ray diffraction pictures (the evidence) but also the less well known theory of helical diffraction, which was absolutely crucial to Crick and Watson's discovery. The insights into this groundbreaking historical episode will have consequences for the 'new' received view of scientific models and their function and relationship to theory and world. The received view, dominated by works by Cartwright and Morgan and Morrison ([1999]), rather than trying to put forth a 'theory of models', is interested in questions to do with (i) the function of models in scientific practice and (ii) the construction of models. In regard to (i), the received view locates the model (as an idealized, simplified version of the real system under investigation) between theory and the world and sees the model as allowing the application of the former to the latter. As to (ii) Cartwright has argued for a phenomenologically driven view and Morgan and Morrison ([1999] ) for the 'autonomy' of models in the construction process: models are determined neither by theory nor by the world. The present case study of the discovery of the DNA structure strongly challenges both (i) and (ii). In contrast to claim (i) of the received view, it was not Crick and Watson's model but rather the helical diffraction theory which served a mediating purpose between the model and the x-ray diffraction pictures. In particular, Cartwright's take on (ii) is refuted by a comparison of Franklin's bottom-up approach with Crick and Watson's top-down approach in constructing the model. The former led to difficulties, which only a strong confidence in the structure incorporated in the model could circumvent. It is also a good rule not to put too much confidence in the observational results that are put forward until they are confirmed by theory.
It is also a good rule not to put too much confidence in the observational results that are put forward until they are confirmed by theory.
(Sir Arthur Eddington [1934] , New Pathways in Science, p. 211) The discovery of the DNA structure has been the subject of two big historical volumes (Olby [1994] and Judson [1996] ), numerous memoirs, biographies, and anniversary articles. 1 One might say that not many episodes in the history of science have been covered as well as this discovery has been. Thus, [i] t appears that everything that could be said about [the discovery of the DNA structure] has been said, that there is no unknown element that could falsify this or that aspect of the story, or at the very least provide a new and original point of view. (Morange [1998], p. 111) In spite of the rich resources provided by the historians, rather oddly, the discovery of DNA has not found entry into philosophical debates. It is the aim of this paper to remove this 'blind spot' in the philosophy of science by making available well-chosen aspects of the available historical material (whilst adding a lot of new material) and presenting it in a form which offers more appeal to the theoretically interested reader than mere historical narratives and descriptions provided by historians.
2 Thereby-contrary to the claim by Morange in the 1 Franklin has been portrayed by Sayre ([1975] ) and Maddox ([2002] ). Of course, some biographies and memoirs are less valuable than others. Sayre's book is a rather angry attempt to defend Franklin against an apparently women-hostile, male-dominated science and not very valuable for the purposes of my paper. The highly praised memoir by Watson in my opinion, too, does not necessarily belong in the first category. This is at least what Crick thought: 'Should you persist in regarding your book as history I should add that it shows such a naïve and egoistical view of the subject as to be scarcely credible. Anything with any intellectual content, including matters that were of central importance to us at the time, is skipped over or omitted. Your view of history is that found in the lower class of women's magazines.' (Crick in Judson [1996] , p. 157) I certainly think it is a gross misunderstanding to interpret Watson's memoir 'as it really was' (Merton [1968] ; in Watson [1980] , p. 213). 2 In presenting 'the facts' historians usually are led by themes of influence: 'how was the individual x influenced by individual y', 'how was the individual x influenced by his cultural and institutional quote above-I do claim to have developed a new and original point of view on the discovery of the DNA structure.
On the very few occasions philosophers of science do refer to the discovery of the DNA structure, their analysis concentrates on the concrete, physical nature and the representative function of the model Crick and Watson constructed out of tin and cardboard.
3 I, however, regard the physical nature of the model peripheral and rather untelling for our (philosophical) understanding of this case. 4 Instead, in this essay I am going to discuss Crick and Watson's DNA model in terms of contemporary accounts of the relationship between the model, theory, and the world.
In recent discussions about models the focus has shifted away from early attempts to characterize and classify models with a strong emphasis on metaphors and analogies (Black [1962] ; Hesse [1966] ; Achinstein [1968] ) and later efforts to define scientific models formally (Suppes [1960] ; van Fraassen [1980] ) towards (i) the function models fulfil in scientific practice and (ii) how they are constructed.
5 Considerable responsibility for having brought about the latter shift belongs to Cartwright ([1983] ); Cartwright et al. ([1995] ) and Morgan and Morrison ([1999] ). These philosophers of science, to a large extent, have given up on finding a proper definition of scientific models:
Although we want to argue for some general claims about models-their autonomy and role as mediating instruments, we do not see ourselves as providing a 'theory' of models. The latter would provide well-defined criteria for identifying something as a model [that are not provided] [. . .] . (Morgan and Morrison [1999], p. 12) Although one is confronted with the reluctance to define models and with a particular reluctance to define models in formal terms (as the proponents of the semantic view prefer to), often it is implicitly assumed that models are 'simplifications', 'idealizations', or 'distortions' of the real system, which is clear from the following quote by Cartwright: background', etc. These themes, however, not only are of a mere suggestive form and don't possess any argumentative force, but also are of course per se not what philosophers are usually interested in anyway. 3 See, for instance (Giere [2004] ) and (Frigg and Hartmann [2006] ). Usually, philosophers' analysis does not go beyond merely comparing the concrete nature of Crick and Watson's model with the 'actual' double helix, pointing out the similarities and dissimilarities between the two, and by taking this to be informative on the representative function of the concrete model. 4 That the physical nature of Crick and Watson's model cannot be as important as philosophers of science have believed is very much apparent from the fact that concrete models have disappeared almost entirely from biochemical practice. Nowadays the same tasks are being done much more conveniently with computer models. 5 See (Schindler [2006] ) for a contrast between the formalist and the 'methodological' approach for describing the semantic view and Cartwright's and Morgan and Morrison's view on models, respectively. See also (Bailer-Jones [1999] ) for a rather partisan narrative on the development of the philosophical treatment of scientific models.
I think that a model-a specially prepared, usually fictional description of the [real] system under study-is employed whenever a mathematical theory is applied to reality and I use the word 'model' deliberately to suggest the failure of exact correspondence [with reality] which simulacra [i.e. models] share with both Hesse's analogical models and with Redhead and Cushing's theoretical models (Cartwright [1983], pp. 158-9) That is, for Cartwright a model is a fictitious entity (she also refers to it as 'simulacrum', or the 'prepared description'), which distorts reality in such a way that allows the application of the theory to reality. The theory is only true of the objects in the model, not of real ones (ibid., p. 17) . In other words, the model renders reality palatable to the theory, although the model itself is constructed without the use of theory: [W] e present the phenomenon in a way that will bring it into the theory. The most apparent need is to write down a description to which the theory matches an equation [. . .] This first stage of theory entry is informal. There may be better and worse attempts, and a good deal of practical wisdom helps, but no principles of the theory tell us how we are to prepare the description. (Cartwright [1983] , pp. 133-4; my italics)
More recently, Cartwright, with others, (Cartwright et al. [1995] ) has emphasized precisely this 'bottom-up' construction of models independently of theory:
What is needed is the recognition of the independence from theory, in methods and aims, of the scientific activity we have come to call phenomenological model building. (Cartwright et al. [1995] Suarez and Cartwright ([2007] ) have now delivered a defence of their position. Contrary to French and Ladyman, Suarez and Cartwright claim that the semantic view and the partial structures approach in particular is inappropriate for accounting for the case of the London and London model of superconductivity. Cartwright and Suarez also accuse French and Ladyman of having misunderstood their phenomenologically driven view of model building. The present paper, however, is not only to be understood as a specific critique of Cartwright's position, but also as a more general critique of 'bottom-up' discovery procedures utterly rejects deduction from theory to models as playing any part in this construction process:
Another kind of argument depends on looking at how we arrive at models in physics-not by deduction from basic theory it turns out. (p. 140)
The same goes for the relation between theory and reality.
But treatments of real systems are not deductive; nor are they approximately deductive, nor deductive with correction, nor plausibly approaching closer to deductivity as our theories progress. (Cartwright [1999a] , p. 9) Thus in conclusion, according to Cartwright, models are fictitious entities, which allow the application of the theory to the world (their function) and are built from the bottom-up from the phenomena without any deductions from theory (their construction). Let us now consider the 'models as mediators' view as characterized by Suarez in Models as Mediators, edited by Morgan and Morrison ([1999] ):
Mediating models always stand between theory and the physical world. Their main function is to enable us to apply scientific theory to natural phenomena [. . .] Morrison has identified three main features. First mediating models are not derivable from theory [. . .] Secondly, these models are not necessitated by the empirical data either [. . .] Finally mediating models have a very significant property: they can replace the physical systems as the central objects of scientific inquiry. (Suarez [1999], p. 168) Again, like Cartwright, the proponents of the 'models as mediators view' claim that the model allows the application of the theory to the world. The model is explicitly located 'between' theory and the world. However, as regards the construction of the model, it is neither determined by theory ('top-down') nor by data ('bottom-up') . The model is 'autonomous'. At this juncture it is interesting to note that also the semantic view (the predominant formalist account of models), which often serves as the target of attack for Cartwright and Morgan and Morrison, not only locates the model between theory and the world (see Giere [1988] , p. 83 for a pictorial illustration of this) but also allocates the same function to models as Cartwright and Morgan and Morrison. According to Morrison '[. . .] the semantic view suggests that we need models where we want to fit the theory to concrete situations' ([1999] , p. 42).
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(see footnote 14). See also (Schindler [2007] ) for the same critique in the case of the discovery of the 'zebra pattern' of magnetic anomalies in the context of the plate tectonic revolution. 7 Patrick Suppes, one of the founders of the semantic view, conjectured that there were many different sorts of models: data models, models of phenomena, and theoretical models. However, the fact remains that he too located those models between the theory and the world.
In this essay I shall show that the discovery of the DNA structure challenges the received view of models in regard to the nature and the construction of models and in regard to the function they fulfil. First, I want to question the appropriateness of the theory-model-world trichotomy and the model's function of allowing the application of theory to the world, about which philosophers of science do not seem to have any disagreement in principle. It will be shown that the discovery of the DNA saw a theory 'mediating' between the model and the world. It must be stressed that this is different from Weisberg's very recent account of abstract direct representation (ADR) (Weisberg [2007] 12 One might even want to say that it is the physical model that is to be considered as a simplification of the real structure. Yet, the irrelevance of the physical nature of Crick and Watson's model was pointed out above (see footnote 4). Of course, it may be objected that there is a sense in which Crick and Watson's model is indeed an idealisation because it does not represent certain properties that are now known to hold in the system, such as the tangled nature of the DNA molecules or even the quantum properties of its constituents. There are two things to be said here. First of all, properties such as the entangled structure of DNA were not in fact known at the time but were posited after the model was constructed and proposed. As in the case of the 'entanglement' (technically: 'supercoiling') of the protein structure (see Section 1.3.1 for details), the supercoiling of DNA was introduced after the structure was postulated in order to account for an empirical mismatch. As has been noted elsewhere: 'The phenomena [sic] of DNA supercoiling was first considered because a new conceptual model was needed to explain all the disparate observations that had arisen in the analysis of the circular polyoma DNA' (Lebowitz [1990] , p. 202; my emphasis). Thus, it may be a bit odd to say that Crick and Watson idealised their original structure by leaving out the complication of supercoiling. Of course, it may be objected that the idealisation of a real object does not necessarily mean idealisation from the known real object. However, that would render idealisation too broad a notion since one could then claim that not only would our past knowledge be an idealisation of our current knowledge but also our current knowledge would be subject to being rendered into an idealisation by our future knowledge. A similar concern pertains to my second remark above: Claiming that a model such as Crick and Watson's is an idealisation because it does not accurately reproduce the properties of electrons, say, runs up concerns to do with the reduction of biology to physics. And given the contentious nature of such a move, I would suggest that again such a broad notion of idealisation should be avoided. Even if someone were to be sympathetic to such a move, there would not be anything special or noteworthy about Crick and Watson's 'idealisation' away from the physical details because then every biochemical structure would be an idealisation. I would like to thank the referee of this paper for encouraging me to think about these issues.
of science have come up with hitherto is the inference to the best explanation (IBE). IBE usually is held by scientific realists but rejected by antirealists, most notably by Bas van Fraassen. Gilbert Harman, often regarded to be the founder of IBE, defines IBE thus:
In making this inference one infers, from the fact that a certain hypothesis would explain the evidence, to the truth of that hypothesis. In general, there will be several hypotheses which might explain the evidence, so one must be able to reject all such alternative hypotheses before one is warranted in making the inference. (Harman [1965] , p. 89) Okasha ([2000] ) has pointed out that although van Fraassen has attacked IBE on the basis of the assumption that IBE is meant to operate in the context of justification, IBE actually is meant to be applicable to the context of discovery too. That is, rather than being used as just some sort of selection procedure for choosing between various hypotheses already in place given a particular set of evidence, IBE also is to be taken as a method for generating hypotheses, which can then be compared and selected for the best:
Given a puzzling phenomenon, we construct a number of hypotheses to try to explain it, and choose the one we think explains the phenomenon best. Looked at this way, IBE is not simply a way of selecting between already existing hypotheses, as per van Fraassen, but also a way of generating the hypotheses on which the selection procedure operates. (Okasha [2000] , p. 695; italics added) 13 The generation of hypotheses by Charles S. Peirce was even characterized as the fundamental feature of abduction (the precursor of IBE) distinguishing it from deduction and induction:
Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis. (Peirce [1931] , 5.171; my emphasis) So, one need not commit to scientific realism in order to be sympathetic to IBE as a form of discovery procedure. Therefore, although Cartwright has followed van Fraassen in rejecting IBE as an inference to the true explanation (see Cartwright [1983] ), I take it that she, through her phenomenologically driven view on the construction of models, is committed to IBE as a construction procedure from evidence towards the model. And indeed, Cartwright has remarked that she has 'no quarrel with induction as a form of inference' (Cartwright [1999a] , p. 12).
14 And it was exactly this sort of inference that Rosalind Franklin was using in her attempt to reveal the structure of DNA.
Franklin conducted experiments and, on the basis of the obtained evidence, she tried to infer the structure that would fit her data best. All the hypotheses she was considering she subjected to the evidence and was happy to reject a hypothesis if it did not 'fit the data'. Furthermore, the hypotheses she had taken into account had to fit all the data available. On the other hand, Crick and Watson chose a very different path. They did not start with the x-ray photographs, the only direct evidence of the structure available, but rather, as is well known, built models on the basis of the known bond angles and distances of the component parts of the DNA. In contrast to Franklin, who was considering every hypothesis she could think of, Crick and Watson stuck to one structural hypothesis throughout. They simply ignored the evidence, which others took as a straightforward refutation of the helical hypothesis. Crick and Watson did not construct their model from the bottom-up, as Cartwright et al. have claimed for the case of superconductivity, which they hold to be a most representative case. Rather, 'top-down' reasoning in the form of deductions derived from a postulated helical structure-contrary to Cartwright's outright rejection of the importance of deductions in scientific practice (cf. p. 623)-played a most crucial part in the discovery of the DNA structure. 15 I consider Crick and Watson's approach, which led to the ultimate solution of the DNA structure, to be highly problematic in particular for Cartwright's phenomenologically driven view and furthermore for those philosophers of science who take abduction, IBE, or any other inductive (i.e., 'bottom-up') inference to be an essential part of discovery procedures.
In the first section of this paper, I will introduce the two principal methods of how to get to the structure of macromolecules in general and the structure of DNA in particular. We shall see that Franklin used a rather 'direct' method starting from the x-ray diffraction pictures, the only direct evidence of the macrostructure. The reader will be made briefly familiar with x-ray crystallography, the technique used to study the structure of crystals and crystallisable materials such as DNA. The other principal method of 'how to get to the structure' involves model building. Here, one tries to assemble a coherent 14 I take it that IBE is a form of induction. More specifically, IBE-with its abductive component-is a procedure for developing very specific conjectures about a target system. This distinguishes it from classical 'generalising' induction. Although inductive reasoning has received a much more general meaning than its classical one in recent years (e.g., Norton [2004] ), in order to safeguard against any misunderstandings, I shall continue speaking of IBE and abduction rather than of induction. 15 Cf. footnote 14. See also (Schindler [2007] ) for the claim that the phenomenon of the zebra pattern that kicked off the plate tectonic revolution was constructed from 'top-down' rather than from the 'bottom-up'. See also (Massimi [2007] ) for a very similar study, albeit in an altogether different realm of science, with very similar conclusions.
macromolecule from the stereochemical knowledge about its constituents. This was the method used by Pauling. In discovering the DNA structure, Crick and Watson followed Pauling's method, whereas Franklin despised this approach. We shall see that Pauling's reported 'panache' in discovering the structure of proteins was his preparedness to disregard x-ray diffraction evidence, which others took very seriously. This, in particular, was a lesson Crick and Watson learned from Pauling and which proved important in the discovery of the DNA structure. In Section 2, we shall encounter the consequences, which were derived from Pauling's protein model, and among them the consequences predicted by the helical diffraction theory, developed by Cochran, Crick, and Vand (CCV), which were to play a pivotal part in the discovery of the DNA structure. The role of the CCV theory, in particular, has been denied the attention it deserves.
In Section 3, we shall consider the reasons why Franklin rejected the helical structure to be viable for the structure of DNA and how she was able to convince her colleagues Wilkins and Stokes of that. In Section 4, I will review the philosophical argument being made throughout this paper and the historical evidence presented in its support.
1 How to Get to the Structure
X-ray diffraction and its synthesis
By means of x-ray diffraction one can determine the positions of atoms in a crystal lattice. 16 X-rays, whose wavelength is of the same order of magnitude as the spacing between the atoms in a molecule, are diffracted by the electrons and leave spots of varying intensity on a photographic plate. The photographs obtained from x-ray diffraction are not like ordinary photographs due to the impossibility of refracting x-rays. The information contained in the photograph gives only half of the information necessary for the knowledge of the structure of the investigated molecule: the intensities of the reflected 17 x-rays but not their phases. Yet, both the amplitudes (calculated from the observed intensities) and the phases are necessary for performing a Fourier synthesis (with the amplitudes figuring as coefficients of the Fourier series 18 ), which is a means 16 A crystal lattice is a repeating pattern of crystals or any crystalline structure. The repeating section is called the unit cell of the structure (cf. e.g., Holmes and Blow [1980] , p. 124). 17 Due to Bragg, x-ray diffraction can be treated as reflection from parallel imaginary 'mirror' planes in the molecule in the crystalline state. Only x-rays with certain angles of incidence are reflected (determined by Bragg's law). Bragg's idea of the 'mirror' planes and the law derived from this idea laid the basis for x-ray crystallography (cf. Cracknell [1969] ). With the help of the Bragg equation nλ = 2d sin (θ) derivable from the Bragg model one can calculate the interatomic distances, which used to be measured in Angstrom units (Å ). Instead of Angstrom units nowadays the nanometre (nm) is the standard unit, whereby 1 Å = 10 −1 nm. I shall stick to the Angstrom units throughout this essay for it is used in the literature I am referring to. 18 Fourier series can represent 'any physical event that repeats at regular intervals' and reduce it to a 'set of simple wave forms, with equivalently simple mathematical statement' (Judson [1996] , p. 516). to 'focus the x-ray mathematically' (cf. Taylor [1967] ) and thus calculate and depict on a contour map the electron density of the specimen. In some cases the phases can be guessed (from the symmetry of the crystal) and in other cases one can infer the phases with the heavy atom method or the method of isomorphous replacement. 19 Those methods, however, cannot be applied to long-chain polymers such as DNA (cf. Olby [1996] , pp. 38-9). Nevertheless, one can circumvent the phase problem by using the so-called Patterson synthesis. The Patterson synthesis is a Fourier series with intensities instead of amplitudes as coefficients. Since the phases do not enter the Patterson synthesis the Patterson map only shows the interatomic distances but not the absolute atomic positions, which results in N(N-1) peaks (not including the central peak and any overlap) relative to the peaks to be observed in a Fourier contour map (see Figure 1 ).
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It was the Patterson function with which Franklin tried to determine the structure of DNA. Franklin's only collaborator at King's College, the PhD student Gosling, has expressed Franklin's attitude towards the structure of the DNA thus:
And I felt repeatedly that [Franklin' s colleague at King's college] Maurice [Wilkins] was trying various ways to stimulate Rosalind into saying something about the structure, but she for her part would say, 'We are not going to speculate, we are going to wait, we are going to let the spots on this photograph [via the Patterson] tell us what the structure is.' (Gosling in Judson [1996] , p. 127; italics added) Crick and Watson were critical about Franklin's approach:
Everything she did was sound enough-almost too sound. She lacked Pauling's panache. (Crick [1988] , p. 69; my emphasis) Pauling's paper [on the structure of proteins; see below] is at least in the proper mood and the type of approach which the people at Kings College London should be taking instead of being pure crystallographers. (Watson to Delbrück, 20 February 1953 , in Judson [1996 Let us consider Pauling's approach, which proved to be so influential on Crick and Watson in the next section. That is, on the basis of stereochemical data (i.e., bond angles and distances), Pauling determined the molecule's structure starting from the components towards the whole structure. Bond angles and lengths set the constraints, which the three-dimensional scale model of the molecule had to satisfy (see Figure 2) .
Model building and Pauling's panache
The historian Horace Judson suitably characterizes Pauling's models as 'open three-dimensional puzzles in which the individual pieces to be fitted together already carried many of the limitations of angles, lengths, and sizes' (Judson [1996] , p. 62). Bond angles, distances, and kinds (single or double) were set. The puzzle-solving occurred on the single bonds:
All the bond distances were known and all the bond angles. However, there can be fairly free rotation about bonds called single bonds (but not, by contrast, about double bonds), and the exact configuration of the atoms in space depends on just how these angles of rotation are fixed. (Crick [1988] , p. 55; my italics) The problem is rather like a three-dimensional jigsaw Series B, Biological Sciences (1934 -1990 , Volume 141, Number 902/March 11, 1953, pp. 10-20. puzzle with curious pieces joined together by rotatable joints (Crick [1954a] , p. 57).
22
Notice that in this quote Crick does not even mention the only direct evidence of the structure of the molecules available, which figured only at the periphery of Crick and Watson's model building but was so central to Franklin's approach: x-ray data of macromolecules. According to Watson, 'the way to get on, in [Crick's] opinion, was to reject any argument which did not arise from the chemistry of nucleic acid chains' (Watson [1980] , p. 101). Franklin, who wanted to work out the structure of the molecule from the x-ray data, was not prepared to pursue model building. Models, for her, had a very low epistemic value:
All that mattered to Franklin were x-ray data, which were the only direct, though complicated, link to the structure of the molecule. Rather than using the model as a means of discovery, Franklin thought that models were the end-products of x-ray data analysis:
I encouraged Bruce Fraser, in our lab, to try out his ideas in a model. Rosalind dismissed our excitement [about model-building] by saying that model-building is what you do after you have found the structure. (Wilkins [2003] , p. 160; my emphasis) 23 Crick and Watson adopted the opposite approach. For them-like for Pauling-building models and solving the puzzles that were set by them came first. However, it was not model building, which had been done a long time before Pauling (see Olby [1994] ), but rather the faith Pauling put into his models and the experimental data, respectively, which proved to be so influential on Crick and Watson: What Pauling did show us was that exact and careful model building could embody constraints that the final answer had in any case to satisfy. Sometimes this could lead to the correct structure, using only a minimum of the direct experimental [x-ray] evidence. This was the lesson that we learned and that Rosalind Franklin and Maurice Wilkins failed to appreciate in attempting to solve the structure of DNA. That, and the necessity for making no assumptions that could not be doubted from time to time. (Crick [1988] , p. 60; italics added) So obviously, the only available direct evidence of the structure DNA in the form of x-ray diffraction pictures played only a minor role not only for Pauling but also for Crick and Watson. Much more important were the constraints set by the model and its stereochemical parameters. 24 It was this attitude which
Crick even believes to have made the difference between successful discovery and failure:
The main difference of approach was that Jim [Watson] and I had an intimate knowledge of the way the α helix [of protein] was discovered [by Pauling, Corey and Branson [1951] ; see next section]. We appreciated what a strong set of constraints the known interatomic distances and angles provided and how postulating that the structure was a regular helix reduced the number of free parameters drastically. (Crick [1988] , p. 68; my emphasis)
Let us pause here for a moment. Quite apparently, although constraints were set by stereochemistry, they appear not to have been sufficient for discovering 23 See also (Maddox [2002] , p. 161). 24 We shall even see very soon that the constraints set by the model even could overrule the available evidence. See also the following quotes in this section.
the structure in question. Rather, the structure being helical was a postulate! We shall come back to this point in the next section. The quote by Crick continues thus:
The King's workers were reluctant to be converted to such an approach. Rosalind [Franklin] , in particular, wanted to use her experimental data as fully as possible. I think she thought that to guess the structure by trying various models, using a minimum of experimental facts, was too flashy.
(ibid.)
So, whereas Crick and Watson chose to follow Pauling's model-building approach with only a marginal use of x-ray evidence, Franklin, in contrast 'wanted to use her data as fully as possible'. What is more, Crick even promotes-rather shockingly for our usual intuitions about science I believe-ignorance of most of the experimental evidence:
Thus, not only is the method of building scale models an extremely powerful one, since it embodies a large amount of data which any successful model must include, but for structures of this type it may well pay to build models without giving much attention to the experimental evidence. [. . .] There is a case, in fact, for careful model building independent of most of the experimental data. (Crick [1954b] , p. 217; my emphasis)
Crick is not an exception. Wilkins, in his memoir, entertainingly concedes that Our main mistake was to pay too much attention to experimental evidence. Nelson won the battle of Copenhagen by putting his blind eye to the telescope so that he did not see the signal to stop fighting. In the same way, scientists sometimes should use the Nelson Principle and ignore experimental evidence. (Wilkins [2003], p. 166; my emphasis) What then is the reason why Crick, Watson, and Wilkins, three Nobel Prize winners, promoted the ignorance of experimental evidence? We shall find it out in the next section.
1.3 The structure of proteins 1.3.1 A failed inference to the best explanation By way of introducing my discussion about the discovery of the structure of proteins and in order to further illustrate Franklin's approach towards discovering the structure of DNA, I want to briefly consider Max Perutz's attempt to decipher the structure of haemoglobin. As Franklin later was going to use the Patterson method in her search for the structure of DNA, Perutz used the Patterson method for investigating the structure of haemoglobin. Perutz found Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences (1934-1990) , Volume 195, Number 1043 /February 03, 1949 that its Patterson contour maps exhibited well-ordered rod-like structures parallel to the crystallographic x-axis (Figure 3) . The underlying structure inferred from the described Patterson maps is depicted in Figure 4 where a central rod is surrounded by a hexagon whose corners are marked by rods-all of which Perutz interpreted as polypeptide chains. And indeed, Perutz model of Figure 4 seems to be the most straightforward explanation for the data depicted in Figure 3 . One can almost 'see' the structure in the Patterson maps! And this is exactly the procedure Franklin pursued in trying to discover the structure of DNA. She too sought to infer the structure from the Patterson map. This line of reasoning from the data to the underlying reality of the phenomena is exactly what the proponents of IBE claim scientists actually do and also should do. However, it turned out that the use of the Patterson method in figuring out the structure of macromolecules was deceptive. Crick ([1952a] ) showed that Perutz' model for haemoglobin of long parallel chains could not be correct. He calculated the peaks on the Patterson map to be expected if such a structure as proposed by Perutz was assumed to be correct (cf. Judson [1996] , pp. 527-8). The actual structure of proteins was to be revealed later by Pauling in a rather different way.
The misleading 5.1 Å spot in proteins and how to get rid of it
After Perutz had failed with his 'bottom-up' method, he joined forces with his colleagues Bragg and Kendrew (henceforth BKP) at the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge and tried a different approach. Similarly to what Maurice Huggins had already done in 1943 (see Olby [1994] ), they reviewed and proposed those structures for proteins (among them a number of helical structures) which they thought were possible structures (ten in total). They then ruled out those structures which were inconsistent with the x-ray data and the Patterson maps (Bragg et al. [1950] ). In particular, they made the 5.1 Å repeat in the fibre direction (corresponding to an observed spot on the so-called meridian of the x-ray pictures; see below), which the contemporary authority on x-ray crystallography of fibres, Bill Astbury at the University of Leeds, had discovered, a condition their models had to satisfy. More specifically, they took the 5.1 Å repeat to be equivalent with the pitch of the helix, i.e., the distance between successive turns. This assumption was theoretically supported by the fact that the 5.1 Å repeat was consistent with helices with an integral symmetry axis (cf. Crick [1954] , p. 217). Moreover, in crystallography two-, three-, four-, or six-fold (i.e., integral) symmetries are the only possible symmetry axes because only with them can the unit cell repeat indefinitely in two or three dimensions (cf. Crick and Kendrew [1957], p. 149) . 25 In other words, the x-ray evidence and
x-ray theoretical reasoning formed a package, which only Pauling managed to break up. J. D. Bernal recalls that
[w]e clung to the rules of crystallography, constancy of angles and so forth, the limitation of symmetry rotations to two-, three-, four-, and six-fold, 25 The n-fold screw axis of a structure is defined as the rotation of the structure through an angle of 360
• /n about the axis and a simultaneous translation of the structure parallel to the axis. BKP decided that a twofold fibre axis with three residues per turn, equivalent to the model that had been proposed by Astbury and Bell ([1941] ), i.e., a nonhelical structure, would fit the Patterson patterns best. In fact, BKP rejected a model very much akin to Pauling's alpha helix (see Section 1.2) because it did not satisfy the 5.1 Å repeat condition (cf. Crick [1988] , p. 58 and Olby [1994] , p. 289). 26 Pauling himself was first irritated by the 5.1 Å spot. He describes his first attempt to unveil the structure of proteins in the late 1930s thus:
I spent the summer of 1937 in an effort to find a way of coiling a polypeptide chain in three dimensions compatible with the x-ray data reported by Astbury. This effort was unsuccessful, which led me to conclude that I was making some unjustified assumption about the structural properties of the molecules. (Pauling in Judson [1996] , p. 62; my emphasis)
Pauling's failure to build a structure of proteins consistent with Astbury's data (of 5.1 Å in particular) made Pauling study the structure of the simpler components of proteins: amino acids and peptides. However, 11 years of investigation revealed that . . . there wasn't something important that we were overlooking [. . .] and by 1948 it was evident that there were no surprises about these molecules, really. We had made our [stereochemical] information more precise but hadn't changed our understanding in any qualitative sense (Pauling in Judson [1996] , p. 64).
Not until 1948, when Pauling was lying in bed with a cold on his stay in Oxford as a visiting scholar, did he solve the problem by drawing on paper the chemical structure of a polypeptide chain including bond angles and lengths from memory and then folding the structure in space. Now, I do not think that it was the fact that Pauling used paper as a tool that proved essential in discovering the structure, as some scholars might be happy to claim (see Klein [2001] , [2003] and in particular Nye in Klein [2003] ). Rather, apart from his intricate stereochemical knowledge (including the planarity of peptide bonds), which I discussed in Section 1.2, it was a symmetry argument, i.e., a purely theoretical idea, which was crucial to Pauling's discovery: given two identical and asymmetrical objects in space the general, mathematically provable, symmetry relation holding between these two objects is a rotation around and a translation along the axis between these objects. If this operation is repeated, one arrives at a helical structure (cf. Pauling in Judson [1996] , p. 64). 27 And it is after all the repetitions within a structure that one observes on x-ray diffraction pictures (in this case, the peptide monomers stacked 'on top' of each other). Pauling reports that this was the idea that he 'had in 1948, and had not had in 1937' (ibid.). For this idea to work, one had to make certain idealisations about the twenty amino-acid residues:
Back in 1937 I had been so impressed by the fact that the amino-acid residues in any position in the polypeptide chain may be of any of twenty different kinds that the idea that with respect to folding they might be nearly equivalent had not occurred to me. I accordingly thought to myself, what would be the consequences of the assumption that all of the aminoacid residues are structurally equivalent, with respect to the folding of the polypeptide chain? (Marinacci [1995] , p. 124; my emphasis) 28 In other words, Pauling had to treat the amino-acid residues as equivalent before he could arrive at the idea of a helical structure. The helical symmetry of proteins, however-since non-integral-does not fall into any of the possible crystallographic symmetry groups. (True crystallographic symmetry was going to be recovered by the packing of the molecules; see below). This still was strongly inconsistent with Astbury's 5.1 Å spot, which (due to its location on the meridian of the x-ray pictures) seemed to unequivocally imply that some structure within the molecule had to repeat after this distance-and the obvious candidate for this was the pitch of the helix after all. But since BKP had published their paper (discussed above), where they considered (but rejected) a number of helical structures (among them the 'correct' but slightly distorted one), Pauling felt the time had come to simply ignore Astbury's 5.1 Å spot for the time being and to go ahead with the publication of a structure without proper crystallographic repeat. Crick recollects that [Pauling] had not attempted to make the structure with an integer screw but had let the models fold naturally into any screw they were comfortable with. [. . .] The fact that his model did not explain the 5.1 Å reflection on the meridian he put to one side. The irony was that Bragg, Kendrew and Perutz had built, among other models, one that was, in effect an α helix, but they had deformed the poor thing to make it have an exact fourfold axis.
This made it look very forced, as indeed it was. (Crick [1988] , p. 58; my emphasis)
Again, Pauling, in contrast to BKP, put stereochemical considerations-in the quote by Crick paraphrased in aesthetical terms-before the x-ray evidence (and reasoning). Instead of assuming a three-or four-fold axis of symmetry, accommodating the 5.1 Å reflection, as BKP did, PCB ignored Astbury's spot and proposed 3.6 amino acids per repeat (i.e., a non-integral axis of symmetry corresponding to 100
• rotation about the screw axis). This was the only model that satisfied all the stereochemical constraints (cf. Pauling, Corey, and Branson [1951] , p. 208). For this structure Pauling later coined the name 'α helix'.
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From the number of the amino-acid residues per helical turn (and an interresidue nitrogen-hydrogen-bond distance) followed that the helix had to have a repeat of 5.4 Å instead one of 5.1 Å and an inter-residue distance of 1.5 Å (=5.4 Å /3.6) , p. 209). Encouragement for the correctness of his model Pauling found in a study of synthetic proteins by Bamford, Hanby, and Happey ([1951] ), which had yielded the 5.4 Å spot his model had predicted (cf. Olby [1994] There was another structure with 5.1 residues per turn, which also satisfied the constraints. Pauling coined it the γ helix. However, Pauling later rejected this structure as unlikely , p. 729; cf. Crick [1954], p. 210) . 30 This spot is observed in synthetic polypeptides because they are not packed into supercoils (see below). 31 This phenomenon, of course, is known as 'theory-ladenness' of observations and has been a scorn to philosophers of science. Another most interesting example for theory-ladenness is discussed in (Schindler [2007] ). 5.4 Å spot, which followed from his model. If one presumed that non-integral helices are bent into superhelices or so-called 'coiled coils'-like ropes coiling into a cable-the single non-integral helices deform slightly and, due to their experienced deformation, produce the 5.4 Å spot ( Figure 5 ). 32 In other words, Pauling's model offered the resources for explaining away Astbury's 5.1 Å spot in the form of the supercoiling or coiled coil. 33 Although this might seem to be utterly ad hoc and thus unsound scientific practice, this is exactly what happened without having been denounced by the scientific community-and rightly so! In the last section, we were asking how the Nobel Prize winners Crick, Watson, and Wilkins could have possibly promoted the ignorance of evidence. In this section, we saw why: Astbury's 5.1 Å spot stood in the way of the 'discovery' or rather postulation of the alpha helix of proteins. The Astbury spot was incompatible with perfectly symmetrical helices. Whereas BKP built their models in accordance with the Astbury spot, Pauling opted to ignore it, quite apparently on the basis of his intricate stereochemical knowledge and his theoretical symmetry argument. 34 Most importantly for our discussion, 32 (Pauling and Corey [1953] ). Crick came up with the same idea almost simultaneously: (Crick [1952b] ). According to Judson ([1996] , p. 129) Pauling's paper arrived at Nature only one or two days after Crick's. 33 Although modern research has established irregularities in the coiling, the basic idea of coiled coils is still entirely accepted (cf. Gruber and Lupas [2003] ). 34 There is admittedly another, sociological, dimension to Pauling's discovery. Pauling, in contrast to BKP, was not trained as a crystallographer and therefore found it much easier to reject one This failure on the part of my colleagues [i.e. BKP] to discover the α helix made a deep impression on Jim Watson and me. Because of it I argued that it was important not to place too much reliance on any single piece of experimental evidence. It might turn out to be misleading, as the 5.1 Å reflection undoubtedly was. (Crick [1988] , p. 59) 35
Derived predictions from Pauling's alpha-helix of protein molecules
After PCB had proposed their alpha helix with 3.6 residues per repeat of length 5.4 Å , Perutz realized that if this model were correct, a reflection at 1.5 Å had to be observed corresponding to the distance between the amino-acid residues.
36 This reflection had not been observed before but Perutz realized that the photographs of protein taken by Astbury, on which PCB's model was based, could not record this reflection because the used apparatus precluded the observation of such a reflection. Therefore, instead of using a flat plate camera, as Astbury had done, Perutz employed a cylindrical film, which allowed for a Bragg angle of 31 • , which was necessary for recording the 1.5 Å reflection (cf. Figure 6 ; see Perutz [1951a Perutz [ ], [1951b , and Perutz [1998] ). Crick informs us that 'this technique is almost as old as x-ray crystallography, but it was neglected in this field before the work of Perutz' (Crick [1954] , of the fundamental assumptions crystallographers were working with at the time, namely the assumption that crystals always had to have an integral axis of symmetry (see the quote by Bernal) This, once again, confirms Thomas S. Kuhn's dictum that new ideas are brought into a particular science by newcomers or outsiders. See (Schindler [2007] ) for another example in the realm of the plate tectonic revolution. 35 See also Crick's similar remark in (Judson [1996] , p. 93). 36 Cf. [1988] . (Olby [1993] , p. 234; Judson [1996] , p. 69; Crick [1988] , p. 59; Perutz [1998] ). p. 211). Perutz then, as it were, re-discovered this technique in order to test the empirical consequences of the model, which he did successfully. In other words, the model made an impressive novel prediction.
37 But one could put this even more strongly: the PCB model provided the motivation for changing the experimental apparatus, which only then allowed the observation of the 1.5 Å spot. Without the new model, one would therefore perhaps never have observed this spot. Although the 1.5 Å reflection could be read off directly from the model, the general properties of the x-ray diffraction photographs which were to be expected from an α-helix were unknown. In response to the proposal by Pauling and Corey, and in order to establish a link between the whole model and the evidence, ) developed a theory of the effects of helices in x-ray diffraction patterns, which I shall introduce in the next section.
The CCV Theory of Helical X-Ray Diffraction
In x-ray diffraction of organic fibres like DNA, the fibre axis is conventionally mounted along the vertical of the photographic film or plate. By rotating the fibre around the fibre axis whilst bombarding it with x-rays, one obtains the whole reciprocal lattice 39 on the same photograph (not just two dimensions as in a static photograph) because the lattice runs through different angles relative to the x-ray source thus satisfying all the Laue conditions, which are met whenever the path difference between x-ray waves is an integral multiple of the wavelengths, resulting in positive interference. If the Laue conditions are not satisfied, the waves cancel each other out (negative interference). In a rotation photograph the spots will be located on so-called layer lines perpendicular to the meridian, i.e., perpendicular to the fibre axis (cf. Figure  7) . The spots are, due to the random orientation of the fibre's components, sometimes drawn out into smudges and are fewer in number than in crystals. A reciprocal relationship between photograph and actual polymer obtains: the distance between the layer lines (i.e., along the meridian) on the photograph is inversely proportional to the repeat of the polymer along the fibre axis. A large distance between spots on the photograph corresponds to a small spacing between atoms in the fibre. Furthermore, the distances between the spots along the layer lines (along the equator) correspond to repeats at right angles to the fibre direction, i.e., to the fibre's width. 40 37 Elsewhere, I have expressed my reservations about the epistemic import of novel predictions in the appraisal of scientific ideas (see Schindler [2008] ). 38 Dr. John Lydon informed me that the picture in Perutz's Nature paper was printed the wrong way around. The picture here appears in its correct orientation, which is why the letter b is tilted. 39 That is, short distances on the photograph are actually large distances within the crystal lattice and vice versa. 40 Good introductory readings are: (Crick and Kendrew [1957] ; Matthews et al. [2000] ; Astbury [1933] ; Cracknell [1969] ; Lipson [1970] ; and Holmes and Blow [1980] ). For an advanced resource see (van Holde et al. [2006] ). The helical diffraction theory is a nice example of a 'simultaneous discovery'. Vladimir Vand, Crick, William Cochran, and Alec Stokes more or less at the same time developed a theory, which predicted the x-ray diffraction consequences a helical structure would entail. CCV first derived predictions for a continuous and then for a discontinuous helix. 41 Their theory predicted that layer lines to which only high-order Bessel functions contribute would be weak or absent, and that those to which very low orders contribute would be strong. This amounted to meridional absences and a cross-ways pattern on the xray photographs. Figure 8 depicts this pattern (right) to be expected from a helix (left). Remember again that the observed pattern is reciprocal to the actual structure. The distance between the layer lines then corresponds to the repeat of the helix, the 'height' of the cross corresponds to the rise of the helix (Figure 8) , and the angle between the arms of the cross delivers the parameter of the width of the helix. With the CCV theory the interpretation of the x-ray pictures became an unequivocal matter:
Armed with the appropriate theory [i.e. CCV's theory] it is often possible to recognize the helical nature of a fiber structure at a glance, and sometimes to specify the main parameters of the helix and its subunits with very little trouble indeed. (Crick and Kendrew [1957] , p. 145; my emphasis) The CCV theory thus established the deductive link between the structure of the model and the x-ray diffraction data. Only through this link from the top-down did the data gain the certainty and definiteness obvious from the quote above. As we shall see in the next section, the CCV theory was going to play a crucial part in the discovery of the DNA structure.
The role of the CCV theory in the discovery of the DNA structure
Although the CCV theory was developed in response to Pauling's helical model for proteins, it of course applied to any sort of molecule with a helical structure. Cochran, one of the people who hit on the CCV theory independently, supposes that
The main value of this work [of the helical diffraction theory], seen in retrospect, is that it was the first step on the road to the discovery of the structure of DNA by Jim Watson and [Francis] Crick. (Cochran [1987] , p. 16) Figure 9 . X-ray photographs of the A ('crystalline') and the B ('wet') form of DNA (see Franklin and Gosling [1953a] , Figures 1 and 4) . Whereas the A form contains sharp spots the B form exhibits a cross of smudges. Both forms display meridional absences of reflections and strong black arcs on the top and the bottom of the photograph (A: 2.8 Å ; B: 3.4 Å ). Reproduced from Franklin, R. and R. Gosling (1953a) , 'The Structure of Sodium-Thymonucleate Fibres I. The Influence of water content', Acta Crystallographica, 6, p. 673.
In order to appreciate the value the CCV theory had for the discovery of DNA, we first of all need to consider briefly the x-ray diffraction pictures of crystallized DNA.
Fibres, built up of polymers (long chains of molecules consisting of monomers) do not possess the order to be met in crystals. Whereas in crystals the molecules have a set orientation along the three crystallographic axes, in fibres the monomers are in random orientation. Some fibres are said to be crystalline because they consist of small regions which are perfectly crystalline, although this order is not consistent throughout the whole fibre but only local; each small crystalline region will have a different orientation.
In 1951, Franklin and Gosling observed that one had to apply a high degree of humidity in order to obtain a high degree of crystallinity in the DNA. When they tried to increase the crystallinity of the DNA by increasing the relative humidity above 75%, a new x-ray pattern resulted that, contrary to their expectations, exhibited less crystalline order-a structural change had occurred. They dubbed the latter the 'wet' or simply 'B' form and the form at a relative humidity of 75% the 'crystalline' or 'A' form. Because the A form has crystalline order it produces sharp spots, whereas the B form-due to the random orientations of its molecules-produces smears (Figure 9 ). 42 42 Before Franklin established that DNA occurred in two distinct forms (A and B), one was relying on the data by Astbury and Bell, who in 1938 had obtained the first x-ray diffraction pictures of DNA with a marked 3.4 Å spot (as in the B form) but layer lines indicating a structural repeat of 27 Å (i.e. approx. 28 Å , a feature of the A form). Pauling was using Astbury's photographs throughout his attempts to construct models of DNA and was thus at severe disadvantage compared to Crick and Watson who had access to Franklin's data (cf. Judson [1996] , p. 135).
Because the A form was crystallographically more telling in that it contained sharper spots due to a more ordered underlying structure, Franklin preferred the A form over the B form:
Franklin had decided that there were sufficient discrete reflexions in the diffraction pattern of the A form to settle the question of the existence of helices of this form by an objective crystallographic analysis, without any assumptions having to be made. (Klug [1968] , in Watson [1980] , p. 154; my emphasis) 43 On the other hand, Crick and Watson were concentrating on the B-form, because it was a straightforward confirmation of the X-shaped pattern predicted by the CCV theory. And this is the exactly the reason for Watson's astonishment when Wilkins showed him the B-form of DNA which Franklin had produced (compare the predicted X-shaped pattern in Figure 8 and the B form in Figure  9 ):
The instant I saw the picture my mouth fell open and my pulse began to race. The pattern was unbelievably simpler than those obtained previously ('A' form). Moreover, the black cross of reflections which dominated the picture could arise only from a helical structure. With the A form, the argument for a helix was never straight-forward, and considerable ambiguity existed as to exactly which type of helical symmetry was present. With the B form, however, mere inspection of its X-ray picture gave several of the vital helical parameters. (Watson [1980], p. 98; my emphasis) It was the black cross on the x-ray diffraction pictures predicted by the CCV theory which made it immediately clear to Watson that the underlying structure had to be helical. The CCV theory also allowed one to 'read off' the parameters of the helix from the x-ray pattern. Asked by the historian Judson whether Watson knew any of the calculations Franklin had done on the B-pattern, Watson denied and declared that merely 'seeing' the photograph had been enough for him to construct the model of the DNA: The reverse is also true. Without the CCV theory the importance of the B-pattern was not understood. One year before CCV had developed their 44 Compare with pattern B in Figure 9 . From (Olby [1994] ).
x-ray diffraction theory and two years before Franklin discovered the B pattern, Astbury had put his student Beighton onto thymus DNA in 1951, who managed to produce a very pure form of this very B-pattern (cf. Figure 10 ). Yet, Astbury and Beighton rejected the photograph because they thought it was a mix:
Strangely enough, Astbury was disappointed by these results and both Beighton and he obviously thought that the 1938-39 Bell pictures represented pure forms, whereas Beigton's B form was a mixture-with few X-ray spots of course! (Olby [1994] , p. 379; my italics) 45 Clearly then, Astbury and Beighton did not understand what they were seeing because they did not possess the theory, which would have told them unequivocally that the B-pattern was the purest and clearest one could get.
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Equipped with the same theory as Watson, Wilkins, and Stokes, too, realized that Stokes' calculations fit Franklin's B pattern very well. When they mentioned this to Franklin she responded angrily: 'how dare you interpret my results!' (Wilkins [2003] , p. 161) And yet, also Franklin could not escape the conclusion that the consequences derived from a helix by CCV fit fantastically well with her B-pattern and thus made the helical structure for this pattern undebatable. 47 45 I asked Robert Olby where he received this information from. He was not so sure-after all he wrote The Path more than 30 years ago-but in his memory he had talked to Preston and Rudall. 46 Olby ([1972] , p. 436) supports this conclusion. 47 Dr. John Lydon informs me that the match between theoretical predictions and the observed pattern was only accurate for the geometrical pattern, i.e., for the positions of the reflections. In fact, the predictions and the observed pattern exhibited a mismatch of 90%! Normally, the R(eliablility)-factor crystallographers are working with allows for a mismatch of 20-30%. Still, scientists accepted the double helix because 'it was so beautiful it just had to be right!' (my own wordings of a statement by John Lydon; personal communication It is with great regret that we have to announce the death, on Friday 18th July, 1952, of D.N.A. helix (crystalline) . Death followed a protracted illness which an intensive course of Bessel injections had failed to relieve.
49
A memorial service will be held next Monday or Tuesday. It is hoped that Dr. M.H.R. Wilkins will speak in memory of the late helix. (Franklin and Gosling [1952] , quoted in Wilkins [2003] , p. 182)
The reason for this death note of the helix for the crystalline A form was one of Franklin's shots of this form, which displayed 'double orientation', i.e. 'the crystallites were not in random orientation about the fibre axis' and the pattern showed clear differences in the intensities of the reflections on the two sides of the axis (Franklin and Gosling [1953b] ; see also Olby [1974] , pp. 370-1). This was irreconcilable with a helical structure, as Wilkins conceded later:
Stokes and I could see no way round the conclusion that Rosalind had reached after months of careful work. It seemed, in spite of all previous indications, that the DNA molecule was lop-sided and not helical. (Wilkins [2003] , p. 182) Judson ([1996] , p. 112) informs us that '[p]icture and fibre were unique, fortuitous, impossible to duplicate despite many attempts. Franklin came to set great store by this picture', which she described as being 'due either to a mechanical accident to the fibre or to preferential orientation of the crystallites which lie near the surface' (Franklin and Gosling [1953b] , p. 683) but concluded that 'it seems unlikely that [double orientation] could have occurred at all if the individual crystallites had a high degree of symmetry about the fibre axis' (ibid., p. 684). Thus, Franklin was positive and was able to convince Wilkins to Wilkins' work in the aftermath of Crick and Watson's proposed model the mismatch could be reduced significantly. According to Klug ([2004] , pp. 24-5) this process took seven years. But the final 'formal crystallographic proof of the double helix and the base pairing did not come until 1979, when Drew and Dickerson ([1981] ) solved the structure of a dodecameric DNA oligonucleotide of defined sequence, by using the totally objective heavy atom method.' Crick concurs by saying that 'The double helical structure of DNA was thus finally confirmed only in the early 1980s. It took over twenty-five years for our model of DNA to go from being only rather plausible, to being very plausible (as a result of the detailed work on DNA fibres), and from there to being virtually certainly correct. Even then it was correct only in outline, not in precise detail [. . .] The establishment of the double helix could serve as a useful case history, showing one example of the complicated way theories become "fact"'. (Crick [1988] When she told us DNA couldn't be a helix, we said, 'Nonsense'. And when she said but her measurements showed that it couldn't, we said, 'Well, they're wrong'. You see, that was our sort of attitude. (Crick in Judson [1996] , p. 118)
Crick and Watson's dismissive attitude was justified on grounds of their model and the CCV theory, which established the link between model and evidence. Model-building and theory construction provided the backdrop against which evidence was to be assessed and categorized into 'good' or 'bad'. Franklin lacked these resources from the 'top-down' and thus was almost doomed to fail in unveiling the structure of the DNA.
Appreciating all evidence-in vain
Franklin's attitude towards the structure of the DNA before Crick and Watson's discovery has been described-most notably by Watson in his Double Helix-as being ideologically 'antihelical'. 50 However, Franklin's collaborator of her later years Aaron Klug ([1968] ) has done away with this simplification.
[Her attitude] might be more accurately described as one of questioning; the question being whether the structure of B-undoubtedly helical in her view-also applied to the crystalline structure A. (footnote in Klug [1968] in Watson [1980] , p. 154) 50 See also (Hamilton [1968] ).
As mentioned above, Franklin 'set great store' by her antihelical A form photograph. Although Franklin, according to Klug and also Gosling, 51 did not doubt that the B-pattern implied a helix, she tried to find other structures which were compatible with her antihelical A form. As Crick pointed out, Franklin 'wanted to use her experimental data as fully as possible' (Crick [1988] , p. 68) and so she attempted to find a structure that would fit all the data available. Franklin unsuccessfully considered a 'figure of 8 structure' (Judson [1996] , p. 132), 'bananas' and 'double sheets' (ibid., p. 128). Klug summarizes Franklin's premises thus:
[A]lthough there were clearly helices present in the B structure, these might be so distorted, or even undone, by the intermolecular bonds in the crystalline A structure that she had to consider non-helical structures. (Klug [1968] , in Watson [1968] , p. 155) 52 Franklin herself said that the helix in the wet state is therefore presumably not identical with that of the crystalline state (Franklin quoted by Judson [1996] , p. 111)
Because Franklin did not want to commit to any particular hypothesis before she was compelled by the evidence to do so, she had therefore to take seriously every single piece of evidence. This led to some sort of 'deadlock', which did not allow her to form a coherent hypothesis of the structure of DNA. Watson, in Crick's wordings, puts this point thus:
Jim [Watson] was little more brash [sic] , stating that no good model ever accounted for all the facts, since some data was bound to be misleading if not plain wrong. A theory that did fit all the data would have been 'carpentered' to do this and would thus be open to suspicion. (Crick [1988] , pp. 59-60; original emphasis)
Conclusion
In this paper, I tried to make available to philosophical discussions one of the most exciting and historically most well investigated episodes in the history of science. This was done by discussing the historical material against the backdrop of the currently 'received view' of scientific models and their relation to the theory and the phenomena. This received view has the model as some sort of 'simplification', 'distortion', or 'idealization' of the real system and locates it between theory and the world for allowing the application of the former to the latter. Both of these assumptions cannot be confirmed with the present case.
Contrary to the received view, it was not the model (as a sort of hypothesis about the structure of the DNA at the model's core), which mediated between theory and world, but rather the theory developed by Cochran, Crick, and Vand, which fulfilled the mediating role between model and the x-ray diffraction photographs. However, calling the theory's role merely a mediating one would not do justice to the case. The theory's role has to be articulated in much stronger terms: the theory established the deductive link between the model and the data. Only through the theory were the data endowed with a meaning, which could be read off the x-ray photographs at a glance. Interestingly, the evidence gained a certainty it did not possess prior to the deductions from the model through the CCV theory. This was impressively supported by the fact that Astbury and Beighton could not appreciate the value of the very clear B pattern they had obtained long before Franklin. In regard to how the nature of models is usually construed, as pointed out in the introduction already, it is hard to see in what sense Crick and Watson's model is to be considered a simplification or idealization of the real structure of DNA. Before Crick and Watson nobody knew what the real structure looked like so there was no way of idealizing the real structure. 53 Rather, Crick and
Watson postulated the structure, as they themselves declared in their seminal paper 54 Rather than postulating a structure, Franklin started from the only direct evidence on the DNA structure available and used the mathematical technique of the Patterson synthesis in an attempt to infer the (model of the) DNA structure from those x-ray photographs. She explored many different hypotheses that would account for both the A and the B pattern of x-ray photographs. However, she was not able to infer the best explanation due to the fact that she, in consultation with her colleagues Wilkins and Stokes, had ruled out a helical structure for the A pattern and thus saw herself confronted with the apparent need to find another hypothesis for the A pattern, which was going to be different from the structure of the B pattern. , and on the basis of the data attempted to infer the DNA structure, Crick and Watson, in contrast, were very cautious in regard to the validity of the evidence and were led mainly by theoretical considerations and theoretically plausible arguments. Franklin's and Crick and Watson's respective attitudes are a consequence of their respective approaches: whereas Franklin, due to her 'bottom-up' approach, had no grounds for rejecting any piece of evidence as being 'bad' but had to consider every piece of evidence she could get hold of, Crick and Watson, again due to their 'top-down' approach, were happy to ignore any piece of evidence at any time, in case that piece of evidence would not fit with their commitment to the helical structure. This behaviour not only rules out the abductive component of IBE but also the 'selection procedure' of IBE, according to which theories and hypotheses are eliminated when they are contradicted by the evidence. For the same reason, classical hypothetical-deductive confirmation is ruled out as an appropriate candidate for describing this historical episode. There are grounds for suggesting that Crick and Watson's behaviour is not explicable within any of the currently available inference and confirmation schemas. Although Crick and Watson's behaviour according to the current standards within the philosophy of science surely seems to be utterly irrational, in face of the history, it seems to be the more reasonable one. In fact, we observed in this essay that taking particular evidence too seriously blocked some researchers from making discoveries, which were made by others who ignored the same evidence. This is not only true for Franklin, who took too seriously her odd A pattern, which indicated a structure for the DNA different from a helix, but also for Bragg, Kendrew, and Perutz, who took too seriously Astbury's 5.1 Å spot, which lead them to rule out the correct alpha structure for proteins (see Section 1.3). 56 Thus, given all 55 The reason for Crick and Watson's firm commitment, I hold, has to be sought in Pauling's (and Huggins's) theoretical symmetry arguments in favour of helices (see footnote 28). 56 It so happens that similar observations can be made in other sciences too. Einstein, for instance, ignored the positive results of an ether drift experiment carried out by Miller in 1920s, which 'caused a major upheaval in the scientific community' and caused many to reject Einstein's theory of relativity (Hentschel [1992] , p. 604). Another neat example is the controversy between Millikan and Ehrenhaft about whether electrons possess only integral or also fractional charges. Holton ([1978] ) has shown that Millikan disregarded a large amount of the oil drops he gained in his experiments for no apparent reason. Ehrenhaft discounted Millikan's 'style' that 'piles up "hypotheses and corrections"'. His 'style', in contrast, was to 'proceed from the direct facts' and to admit all measurements in his analysis (see ibid., pp. 73, 78, and 79 in particular).
experimental finding by Chargaff, but rather by the fact that the strands had to run antiparallelly, which again was a consequence of Franklin's finding that the crystallographic unit of the A-pattern of DNA was C2-symmetrical. 59 But even if one were still to believe that Chargaff's ratio did play a part in the discovery of the structure of DNA, Crick and Watson's presupposition that the structure was helical, which was the focus of this paper, is not affected.
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59 This, Franklin herself and everybody else who was aware of the contents of her report to the Medical Research Council (Perutz, Wilkins and Stokes) for some strange reason failed to realize (cf. Judson [1996] , p. 142). For the implications of the C2 or 'face-centred' symmetry group see Perutz's explications in (Judson [1996] , p. 102). The fact that the DNA structure belongs to the C2 symmetry group was contained in Franklin's MRC report, which Perutz passed on to Crick and Watson. Although this action has caused some controversy as to whether Perutz had acted ethically the information contained in the MRC report was non-confidential (cf. Judson [1996] , pp. 141-2). 60 The same is true for Donahue's advice that the bases had keto and not enol configuration, which was necessary for being able to pair the bases inside the sugar-phosphate backbones. This claim is also true for the insight that there were not three but only two strands of DNA. Why does the DNA consist of two and not of three chains? Watson ([1968] , p. 171) in his Double Helix stated that the reason was that 'important biological objects came in pairs'. Crick called this later 'non-sense' (cf. Judson [1996] , p. 143). In fact, both Pauling and Crick and Watson built models with three instead of two chains because they were relying on density measurements of DNA by Astbury ([1947] ), which determined a density value of 1.65 g cm −3 . Yet, these measurements were performed on mixes of the A and B forms. The value determined for the A form by Franklin and Gosling ([1953b] , p. 683) was 1.47 g cm −3 being equivalent to 28 nucleotides. The density for the B form could not be established. Since the inter-residual spacing of the nucleotides could not be figured out for the A form Crick and Watson had to do some indirect reasoning: the A form is reduced by roughly 30%, which means that the inter-residual spacing is no longer 3.4 Å but 2.4 Å . Since 28/2.4 = 2, the A form thus contains only two and not three strands.
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